

IMPLEMENTING LOGIC BY SEMANTICS

**The RISCAL Approach to Automating
Program Reasoning over Finite Domains**



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Formal Methods in Computer Science

■ Specification:

- Describe precisely a computational problem to be solved.
 - Precondition: what can be assumed about the inputs.
 - Postcondition: what has to be established for the outputs.
- Formal specification: conditions are precisely formulated in the language of formal (first order predicate) logic.

■ Verification:

- Show that a program correctly implements the specification.
 - For all inputs that satisfy the precondition, the program must produce outputs that satisfy the postcondition.
- Formal verification: given a formal program semantics, correctness can be established with mathematical rigor.

Formal logic is the fundament of precise program reasoning.

1. Formal Specification

2. Proof-Based Verification

3. Semantics-Based Checking

4. Conclusions

A Program Specification

The specification of a “conditional swap” problem.

- **Input:** an integer array a of length N and indices i, j in a :
requires $0 \leq i \wedge i < N \wedge 0 \leq j \wedge j < N$;
- **Output:** an array $result$ that is identical to a except that the elements at i and j are in ascending order:
ensures $a[i] \leq a[j] \Rightarrow result[i] = a[i] \wedge result[j] = a[j]$;
ensures $a[i] > a[j] \Rightarrow result[i] = a[j] \wedge result[j] = a[i]$;
ensures $\forall k: \text{index with } 0 \leq k \wedge k < N.$
 $k \neq i \wedge k \neq j \Rightarrow result[k] = a[k]$;

Conditional Swap

An implementation of the “conditional swap” problem.

```
val N:ℕ; val M:ℕ;
type index = ℤ[-N,N]; type elem = ℤ[-M,M]; type array = Array[N, elem];

proc cswap(a:array, i:index, j:index): array
  requires  $0 \leq i \wedge i < N \wedge 0 \leq j \wedge j < N$ ;
  ensures  $a[i] \leq a[j] \Rightarrow \text{result}[i] = a[i] \wedge \text{result}[j] = a[j]$ ;
  ensures  $a[i] > a[j] \Rightarrow \text{result}[i] = a[j] \wedge \text{result}[j] = a[i]$ ;
  ensures  $\forall k:\text{index} \text{ with } 0 \leq k \wedge k < N. k \neq i \wedge k \neq j \Rightarrow \text{result}[k] = a[k]$ ;
{
  var b:array = a;
  if b[i] > b[j] then
  {
    var x:elem := b[i];
    b[i] := b[j];
    b[j] := x;
  }
  return b;
}
```

Formal Verification

How to rigorously demonstrate the correctness of the program with respect to its specification?

- **Generate verification conditions.**
 - Logic formulas whose validity implies the correctness.
 - Can be automatically generated by a formal calculus.
 - Requires the annotation of the program with sufficiently strong extra-information (loop invariants/termination terms).
- **Prove the conditions.**
 - Possibly performed/supported by an automated reasoner/interactive proof assistant.
 - First order logic is not decidable, thus fully automatic proofs can generally not be expected.
 - In general, (also) human effort is required.

The traditional (and only fully general) approach.

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Verification Condition Generation

E.g., Dijkstra's weakest precondition calculus.

- Verification condition: $pre \Rightarrow wp(prog, post)$

$$wp(x := e, post) := post[e/x]$$

$$wp(\text{skip}, post) := post$$

$$wp(c_1; c_2, post) := wp(c_1, wp(c_2, post))$$

$$wp(\text{if } b \text{ then } c_1 \text{ else } c_2, post) := (b \Rightarrow wp(c_1, post))$$

$$\wedge (\neg b \Rightarrow wp(c_2, post))$$

...

Fully automatic; without loops, no extra information is required.

Verification of the Program

```
var b:array = a;
if b[i] > b[j] then
{
  var x:elem := b[i];
  b[i] := b[j];
  b[j] := x;
}
return b;
```

$wp(cswap, post) :=$

$(b[i] \neq b[j] \Rightarrow post[b/result][a/b]) \wedge$


$(b[i] > b[j] \Rightarrow post[b/result][b[j \mapsto x]/b][b[i \mapsto b[j]]/b][b[i]/x][a/b])$

We have to prove $pre \Rightarrow wp(cswap, post)$;
for this we use some automation support.

The RISC Program Explorer

- **An integrated program reasoning environment.**
 - Programming language MiniJava.
 - Theory/specification language in the style of PVS/CVC.
 - Semi-automatic proving assistant RISC ProofNavigator.
- **Semantics view.**
 - Semantics of a method body.
 - Pre/post-condition reasoning.
- **Analyze view (verification tasks).**
 - Type checking conditions.
 - Statement preconditions.
 - Loop invariants.
 - Method frame preservation.
 - Method termination.
 - Method postcondition.
- **Verify view.**
 - Proof construction and management.

The RISC ProgramExplorer



<https://www.risc.jku.at/research/formal/software/ProgramExplorer>

BubbleSort

```
pred sorted(a:array, i:index)
  requires  $0 \leq i \wedge i < N$ ;
 $\Leftrightarrow \forall k:\text{index}. i \leq k \wedge k < N-1 \Rightarrow a[k] \leq a[k+1]$ ;
```

```
proc bubbleSort(a:array): array
  ensures sorted(result,0);
{
  var b:array = a;
  for var i:index := 0; i < N-1; i := i+1 do
    for var j:index := 0; j < N-i-1; j := j+1 do
      b := cswap(b,j,j+1);
  return b;
}
```

How to verify the correctness of this program?

Verification Condition Generation for Loop

- Weakest precondition of a loop annotated with an invariant:

$$wp(\text{while } b \text{ do}^{inv(x,x')} c^x, post) := inv(x, x) \wedge (\forall x'. inv(x, x') \Rightarrow post[x'/x])$$

- c^x : a command that only changes variable x .
- $inv(x, x')$: a formula that relates a variable's prestate value x to its poststate value x' .
- Also have to prove that the loop body maintains the invariant:

$$inv(x, x') \wedge b[x'/x] \Rightarrow wp(c^x, inv(x, x'))$$

Only partial correctness: for termination, also a “termination measure” is required.

BubbleSort

pred sorted(a:array, i:index) requires $0 \leq i \wedge i < N$;

$\Leftrightarrow \forall k:\text{index}. i \leq k \wedge k < N-1 \Rightarrow a[k] \leq a[k+1]$;

pred lesseq(a:array, i:index) requires $0 \leq i \wedge i < N$;

$\Leftrightarrow \forall k:\text{index}. 0 \leq k \wedge k < i \Rightarrow a[k] \leq a[i]$;

```
proc bubbleSort(a:array): array
  ensures sorted(result,0);
{
  var b:array = a;
  for var i:index := 0; i < N-1; i := i+1 do
    invariant  $0 \leq i \wedge (N > 0 \Rightarrow i < N)$ ;
    invariant sorted(b,N-1-i)  $\wedge (i > 0 \Rightarrow \text{lesseq}(b,N-i))$ ;
  {
    for var j:index := 0; j < N-i-1; j := j+1 do
      invariant  $0 \leq i \wedge (N > 0 \Rightarrow i < N) \wedge 0 \leq j \wedge j < N-i$ ;
      invariant sorted(b,N-1-i)  $\wedge (i > 0 \Rightarrow \text{lesseq}(b,N-i))$ ;
      invariant lesseq(b,j);
      b := cswap(b,j,j+1);
    }
  }
  return b;
}
```

Verification of Loop-Based Programs

- Many potential sources of errors.
 - Errors in the program.
 - Errors in the specification.
 - Errors in the loop invariants.
 - Failure to find the adequate proof strategy.
- If a proof fails, it is hard to determine the reason.
 - Most time in proof-based verification is wasted by attempting to prove invalid verification conditions!

It would be good to have an easier way to find errors.

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Formal Verification

Is there an alternative to proof-based verification?

■ Model Checking

- Check whether program runs satisfy the specification.
- Runtime assertion checking: user selects certain runs.
- Model checking: automatic consideration of all possible runs.

■ Problem: only complete under restrictive assumptions.

- Decidable conditions to be checked.
- Original model checking: state space is finite (domains of all program variables are finite).
- Abstraction-based model checking: program can be checked in a finite abstraction of the state space.
- Bounded model checking: program runs with a bounded number of loop iterations.

Usually applied only to automatic detection of runtime errors.

The RISC Algorithm Language (RISCAL)

- Formal theory and algorithm specification language.
 - Static type system with parameterized types $T[n]$.
 - Functions (implicit, explicit, recursive).
 - Predicates (explicit, recursive).
 - Theorems (predicates claimed to be always true).
 - Procedures (functions defined by commands).
 - Pre-/post-conditions, loop invariants, termination measures.
- Non-deterministic semantics.
 - Implicit function definitions and non-deterministic choices in formulas and programs.
- Semantics-based implementation of programs/formulas.
 - All phrases are translated to their denotational semantics.
 - Model checker executes semantics for all possible inputs.
 - Parallel implementation allows to check large state spaces.

A semantics-based approach to checking and verification.

Denotational Semantics of Programs

$\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket : \text{Command} \times \text{State} \rightarrow \text{State}$

$$\llbracket x := e \rrbracket(s) := s[x \mapsto \llbracket e \rrbracket(s)]$$

$$\llbracket \text{skip} \rrbracket(s) := s$$

$$\llbracket c_1; c_2 \rrbracket(s) := \llbracket c_2 \rrbracket(\llbracket c_1 \rrbracket(s))$$

$$\llbracket \text{if } b \text{ then } c_1 \text{ else } c_2 \rrbracket(s) := \text{if } \llbracket b \rrbracket(s) = \text{true} \text{ then } \llbracket c_1 \rrbracket(s) \text{ else } \llbracket c_2 \rrbracket(s)$$

$$\llbracket \text{while } b \text{ do } c \rrbracket(s) := w(b, c, s) \text{ where}$$

$$w(b, c, s) := \text{if } \llbracket b \rrbracket(s) = \text{false}$$

then s

else $w(b, c, \llbracket c \rrbracket(s))$

Executable by a direct implementation.

Denotational Semantics of Formulas

$\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket : Formula \times State \rightarrow \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$

$$\llbracket p(t_1, \dots, t_n) \rrbracket(s) := \llbracket p \rrbracket(\llbracket t_1 \rrbracket(s), \dots, \llbracket t_n \rrbracket(s))$$

$$\llbracket \neg F \rrbracket(s) := \begin{cases} \text{true} & \text{if } \llbracket F \rrbracket(s) = \text{false} \\ \text{false} & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

$$\llbracket F_1 \wedge F_2 \rrbracket(s) := \begin{cases} \text{true} & \text{if } \llbracket F_1 \rrbracket(s) = \llbracket F_2 \rrbracket(s) = \text{true} \\ \text{false} & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

...

$$\llbracket \forall x : T. F \rrbracket(s) := \begin{cases} \text{true} & \text{if } \forall a \in \llbracket T \rrbracket. \llbracket F \rrbracket(s[x \mapsto a]) = \text{true} \\ \text{false} & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

...

Executable by a direct implementation (provided that the semantics $\llbracket T \rrbracket$ of every type T is finite).

Relationship Semantics to Logic

The weakest precondition calculus is sound with respect to the denotational semantics of programs and formulas:

$$\begin{aligned} (\forall s \in State. \llbracket pre \Rightarrow wp(c, post) \rrbracket(s) = \text{true}) &\Leftrightarrow \\ (\forall s \in State. \llbracket pre \rrbracket(s) \Rightarrow \llbracket post \rrbracket(\llbracket c \rrbracket(s))) & \end{aligned}$$

- If the derived verification condition is valid, then every execution of the program that starts in a state that satisfies the precondition yields a result state that satisfies the postcondition . . .
- . . . and vice versa.

Proof-based verification and semantics-based checking yield the same result.

Semantics-based Implementation

$ComSem := Single + Multiple$

$Single := Command \rightarrow (Context \rightarrow Context)$


$Multiple := Command \rightarrow (Context \rightarrow Seq(Context))$

$Seq(T) := Unit \rightarrow (Null + Next(T, Seq(T)))$

```
public static interface ComSem {
    public interface Single extends ComSem, Function<Context,Context> { }
    public interface Multiple extends ComSem, Function<Context,Seq<Context>> { }
}
public interface Seq<T> extends Supplier<Seq.Next<T>> {
    // public Seq.Next<T> get();
    public final static class Next<T> {
        public final T head; public final Seq<T> tail;
        ...
    }
}
```

Non-deterministic semantics based on lazy sequences.

The RISCAL Software



The screenshot displays the RISCAL software interface. The main window is titled "RISC Algorithm Language (RISCAL)". The left pane shows a code editor with the following content:

```
1//
2// Computing the greatest common divisor by the Euclidean Algorithm
3//
4
5val N: N;
6type nat = N[N];
7
8pred divides(m:nat,n:nat) = ∃p:nat. m*p = n;
9
10fun gcd(m:nat,n:nat): nat
11  requires m ≠ 0 ∨ n ≠ 0;
12  choose result:nat with
13    divides(result,m) ∧ divides(result,n) ∧
14    ~∃r:nat. divides(r,m) ∧ divides(r,n) ∧ r > result;
15
16theorem gcd0(m:nat) = m#0 = gcd(m,0) = m;
17theorem gcd1(m:nat,n:nat) = m ≠ 0 ∨ n ≠ 0 = gcd(m,n) = gcd(n,m);
18theorem gcd2(m:nat,n:nat) = 1 ≤ n ∧ n ≤ m = gcd(m,n) = gcd(m-n,n);
19
20proc gcdp(m:nat,n:nat): nat
21  requires m#0 ∨ n#0;
22  ensures result = gcd(m,n);
23{
24  var a:nat = m;
25  var b:nat = n;
26  while a > 0 ∧ b > 0 do
27    invariant gcd(a,b) = gcd(old_a,old_b);
28    decreases a+b;
29    {
30      if a > b then
31        a = a#b;
32      else
33        b = b#a;
34    }
35    return if a = 0 then b else a;
36  }
37
38proc main(): ()
39{
40  choose m:nat, n:nat with m ≠ 0 ∨ n ≠ 0;
41  print m,n,gcdp(m,n);
42}
43
44
```

The right pane is titled "Analysis" and contains the following information:

Translation: Nondeterminism Default Value: 0 Other Values: []

Execution: Silent Inputs: [] Per Mill: [] Branches: []

Parallelism: Multi-Threaded Threads: 4 Distributed Servers: []

Operation: gcd2(Z,Z)

RISC Algorithm Language 1.0 (March 1, 2017)
http://www.risc.jku.at/research/formal/software/RISCAL
(C) 2016-, Research Institute for Symbolic Computation (RISC)
This is free software distributed under the terms of the GNU GPL.
Execute "RISCAL -h" to see the available command line options.

Reading file /home/schreine/papers/RISCALManual2017/gcd.txt
Using N=100.
Type checking and translation completed.

<http://www.risc.jku.at/research/formal/software/RISCAL>

Verifying via Checking Finite Instances

A step-wise approach to verification.

- Program $P^A[n]$ and specification $S[n]$.
 - Parameter $n \in \mathbb{N}$ bounds size of every variable type $T[n]$.
 - May have different bounds for different types.
 - Value of parameter is arbitrarily large (not fixed in program).
- Program operates over a finite domain.
 - Can be executed for all inputs of the domain.
- Specification and annotations are decidable.
 - By evaluating their semantics over the domain.

Structure of program/specification can be used for the validation of correctness before its actual verification.

Verification via Checking Finite Instances

Verify some finite instance $P^A[c]$ and $S[c]$.

■ Testing

- Run $P[c]$ with some input $i \in D[c]$ and watch output.
- Validate informal correctness of program for some inputs.

■ Runtime assertion checking

- Additionally evaluate $A[c]$ and $S[c]$ and report violations.
- Validate formal correctness of program for some inputs.

■ Model checking

- Runtime assertion checking for every input $i \in D[c]$.
- Validate formal correctness for all inputs in $D[c]$.
 - May detect that $A[c]$ respectively $S[c]$ is too strong.

■ Generate verification condition $VC[c] = vc(P^A[c], S[c])$.

- Decidable by evaluation.
 - May detect that $A[c]$ is too weak.

Verify correctness of some $P^A[c]$ with respect to $S[c]$.

Verifying via Checking Finite Instances

Verify every instance $P^A[n]$ and $S[n]$.

- Prove $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}. VC[n]$
 - Computer-assisted reasoning again.
 - But now, by previous validation, high chance of being valid.

Verify correctness of $P^A[n]$ w.r.t. $S[n]$ for arbitrary $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

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Conclusions

- RISC Algorithm Language released in 2017.
 - Since then used in formal method courses
 - Contents developed by students (computer science, discrete mathematics, number theory, computer algebra, ...).
 - Very positive initial feedback due to “full automation”.
 - Visualization component recently added.
 - Current work on generation of verification conditions.
 - Further development within LOGTECHEDU and SEMTECH.
 - LOGTECHEDU: Logic Technology for Computer Science Education, LIT seed project, 2017–2019.
 - SEMTECH: Austrian OEAD WTZ and the Slovak SRDA project SK 14/2018, 2018–2019.

<https://www.risc.jku.at/research/formal/software/RISCAL>